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Abstract
We introduce noncooperatively optimized tolerance (NOT), a generalization of
highly optimized tolerance (HOT) that involves strategic (game theoretic) interac-
tions between parties in a complex system. We illustrate our model in the forest
fire (percolation) framework. As the number of players increases, our model re-
tains features of HOT, such as robustness, high yield combined with high density,
and self-dissimilar landscapes, but also develops features of self-organized criti-
cality (SOC) when the number of players is large enough. For example, the forest
landscape becomes increasingly homogeneous and protection from adverse events
(lightning strikes) becomes less closely correlated with the spatial distribution of
these events. While HOT is a special case of our model, the resemblance to SOC
is only partial; for example, the distribution of cascades, while becoming increas-
ingly heavy-tailed as the number of players increases, also deviates more signifi-
cantly from a power law in this regime. Surprisingly, the system retains consider-
able robustness even as it becomes fractured, due in part to emergent cooperation
between neighboring players. At the same time, increasing homogeneity promotes
resilience against changes in the lightning distribution, giving rise to intermediate
regimes where the system is robust to a particular distribution of adverse events,
yet not very fragile to changes.
1 Introduction
Highly optimized tolerance (HOT) and self-organized criticality (SOC) have received
considerable attention as alternative explanations of emergent power-law cascade dis-
tributions [1, 2]. The SOC model [1, 3, 4] posits that systems can naturally arrive
at criticality and power-law cascades, independently of initial conditions, by follow-
ing simple rule-based processes. Among the important features of SOC are (a) self-
similarity and homogeneity of the landscape, (b) fractal structure of cascades, (c) a
small power-law exponent (i.e., heavier tails), and (d) low density and low yield (e.g.,
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in the context of the forest fire model, described below). HOT [2, 5, 6, 7], in contrast,
models complex systems that emerge as a result of optimization in the face of persis-
tent threats. While SOC is motivated by largely mechanical processes, the motivation
for HOT comes from evolutionary processes and deliberately engineered systems, such
as the electric power grid. The key features of HOT are (a) a highly structured, self-
dissimilar landscape, (b) a high power-law exponent, and (c) high density and high
yield [6].
HOT and SOC can be cleanly contrasted in the context of the forest fire (percola-
tion) model [2, 4]. The forest fire model features a grid, usually two-dimensional, with
each cell being a potential site for a tree. Intermittently, lightning strikes one of the cells
according to some probability distribution. If there is a tree in the cell, it is set to burn.
At that point, a cascade begins: fires spread recursively from cells that are burning to
neighboring cells that contain trees, engulfing the entire connected component in which
they begin. The main distinction between HOT and SOC in the forest fire model is how
they conceive the process of growing trees in the grid. In the classical forest fire model
(SOC) a tree sprouts in every empty cell with some fixed probability p. The light-
ning strike distribution is usually conceived as being uniform. As the process of tree
growth interleaves with burnouts, the system reaches criticality, at which burnout cas-
cades (equivalently, sizes of connected components) follow a power-law distribution.
At criticality, the tree landscape is homogeneous and self-similar, and burnouts follow
a fractal pattern. Additionally, both the fraction of cells with trees before lightning (the
density) and after lightning (the yield) are relatively low at criticality. In contrast, the
HOT model conceives of a global optimizer charged with deciding the configuration
of each cell (i.e., whether a tree will grow or not). What emerges globally as a conse-
quence is a collection of large connected components of trees separated by “barriers”
of no trees that prevent fires from spreading outside components. This pattern, which is
self-dissimilar, adapts to the specific spatial distribution of lightning strikes. In certain
cases, for example, when the lightning distribution is exponential or Gaussian, out of
this adaptation emerges a precise balance of connected component sizes and fire prob-
abilities so as to yield a power-law distribution of cascades (burnouts), with a higher
exponent than the distribution of cascades in the SOC model. The HOT model features
both high yield and high density, as it is deliberately robust to lightning strikes with the
specified distribution; however, it is also extremely fragile to changes in the lightning
distribution, whereas SOC does not exhibit such fragility. The HOT landscape tends
to have a highly non-uniform distribution of “fire breaks”, or areas where no trees are
planted, whereas the SOC landscape is homogeneous.
A natural criticism of the HOT paradigm is that, in complex systems, it is difficult
to conceive of a single designer that manages to optimally design such a system. As a
partial response, much work demonstrates that HOT yields qualitatively similar results
when heuristic optimization or an evolutionary process is used [5, 8, 9]. Still, most
complex systems, particularly those that are engineered, are not merely difficult to de-
sign globally, but are actually decentralized, with many entities responsible for parts
(often small) of the whole system. Each entity is generally not motivated by global
concerns, but is instead responding to local incentives, which may or may not align
with global goals. For example, the Internet is fundamentally a combination of au-
tonomous entities, each making its own decisions about network topology, protocols,
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and composition, with different decisions made at different levels of granularity (some
by large Internet service providers, some by large organizations connected to the In-
ternet, some by small organizations and individual users). Likewise, the electric grid
emerges as a by-product of complex interactions among many self-interested parties,
including electric utilities, electricity users (which are themselves businesses or indi-
viduals), and various government and regulatory entities that have their own interests
in mind. Most moderately complex engineered products are manufactured from com-
ponents produced by different firms, each with its own goals driven primarily by the
market within which it competes, and many of these components are further broken
down and produced by their own set of suppliers, and so on.
Our central contribution is to model complex systems as complex patterns of strate-
gic interactions among self-interested players making independent decisions. We con-
ceive that out of strategic interactions of such self-interested players emerges a system
that is optimized jointly by all players, rather than globally by a single “engineer”.
Thus, we call our model noncooperatively optimized tolerance (NOT). Formally, our
model is game theoretic, and we seek to characterize emergent properties of the system
in a Nash equilibrium [10]. Our model strictly generalizes the HOT framework, with
HOT being the special case of a game with a single player.
2 A Game Theoretic Forest Fire Model
We begin by introducing some general game theoretic notions, and then instantiate
them in the context of a forest fire model. A game is described by a set of players
I, numbering m = |I| in all, where each player i ∈ I chooses actions from a strat-
egy set Si so as to maximize his utility ui(·). Notably, each player’s utility function
depends on the actions of other players as well as his own, and so we denote by
ui(s) = ui(si,s−i) the utility to player i when he plays a strategy si and others jointly
play s−i ≡ (s1, . . . ,si−1,si+1, . . . ,sm), where these combine to form a joint strategy pro-
file s = (s1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sm). In our context, each player controls a portion of a complex
system and is responsible for engineering his “domain of influence” against perceived
threats, just as in the HOT model. The distinction with the HOT model is that the inter-
ests of different players may be opposed if, say, an action that is desirable for one has a
negative impact on another (for example, one player may dump his trash on another’s
territory). Such interdependencies are commonly referred to as externalities [11], and
form a central aspect of our model. However, HOT arises as a special case of our
construction, when the game has a single player.
We implement the game theoretic conception of complex system engineering in
the familiar two-dimensional forest fire model, thereby allowing direct contrast with
the now mature literature on HOT and SOC. In the NOT forest fire model, each player
is allotted a portion of the square grid over which he optimizes his yield less cost of
planting trees.1 Let Gi be the set of grid cells under player i’s direct control, let si be
1We note the resemblance of our grid division into subplots to the framework studied by Kauffman et
al. [12], which divides a lattice in a similar manner, but with the goal of studying joint optimization of
a global objective, rather than strategic interactions among players controlling different plots and having
different goals.
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player i’s strategy expressed as a vector in which si,g = 1 if i plants a tree in grid cell
g and si,g = 0 otherwise, and let Pr{g = 1 | s,si,g = 1} be the probability (with respect
to the lightning distribution) that a tree planted in cell g survives a fire given the joint
strategy (planting) choices of all players. Since exactly one player controls each grid
cell, we simplify notation and use sg = si,g where i is the player controlling grid cell g.
Let Ni = |Gi| be the number of grid cells under i’s control and ρi be the density of trees
planted by i,
ρi =
1
Ni
∑
g∈Gi
sg.
Define the yield for player i to be
Yi(s) = ∑
g∈Gi
Pr{g = 1 | s}sg
(it is convenient to define the yield as an absolute number of trees). We assume further
that each tree planted by a player incurs a fixed cost c. The utility of player i is then
ui(s) = ∑
g∈Gi
(Pr{g = 1 | s}− c)si,g = Yi(s)− cNiρi.
The result of joint decisions by all players is a grid that is partially filled by trees,
with overall density ρ(s) and overall yield Y (s) given by a sum ranging over the entire
grid G, i.e., Y (s) = ∑g∈G Pr{g = 1 | s}sg. Let N be the number of cells in the entire
grid. We then define global utility (welfare) as
W (s) =∑
i∈I
ui(s) = Y (s)− cNρ(s).
Note that when m = 1, W (s) coincides with the lone player’s utility. A part of our en-
deavor below is to characterize W (s∗) and ρ(s∗) when s∗ is a Nash equilibrium, defined
as a configuration of joint decisions by all players such that no individual player can
gain by choosing an alternative strategy s′i (alternative configuration of trees planted)
keeping the decisions of other players s∗−i fixed.
We systematically vary several parameters of the model. The first, which is the
main subject of this work, is the number of players m. Fixing the size of the grid
at N = 128× 128,2 we vary the number of players between the two extremes, from
m = 1 to m = N. The former extreme corresponds precisely to the HOT setting,
while in the latter the players are entirely myopic in their decision problems, each
concerned with only a single cell of the grid. The negative externalities of player de-
cisions are clearly strongest in the latter case. The entire range of player variation is
m ∈ {1,22,42,82,162,322,642,1282}. The second parameter that we vary is the cost
of planting trees: c ∈ {0,0.25,0.5,0.75,0.9}. Finally, we vary the scale of the light-
ning distribution, which is always a truncated Gaussian centered at the top left corner
of the grid. We let the variance (of the Gaussian before truncation) be N/v, and vary
v ∈ {0.1,1,10,100}. For example, at v = 1 the standard deviation of the Gaussian
covers, roughly, the entire size of the grid, and at v = 0.1 the distribution of lightning
2This was the largest grid size on which we could approximate equilibria in reasonable time.
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strikes is approximately uniform over the grid. In contrast, v = 100 gives a distribution
with lightning strikes highly concentrated in the top left corner of the grid.
The question yet to be addressed is how to partition the grid into regions of influ-
ence for a given number of players m. We do this in the most natural way by partitioning
the grid into m identical square subgrids, ensuring throughout that m is a power of 4.
3 Analysis of the NOT Forest Fire Model
To build some intuition about our model, consider first a one-dimensional forest fire
setting. Since in one dimension sequences of planted cells (1’s) are interleaved with
unplanted sequences (0’s), we define k to be the length of a planted sequence and l be
the length of an unplated sequence, and assume that 1 k N. First, consider the
case with m= 1 and assume that c < 1−1/N. We further assume that k is identical for
all sequences of 1’s (when k N, this is almost with no loss of generality, since 1’s
can be swapped, keeping the density constant, without changing the utility) and note
that in an optimal solution l = 1. The utility of the player (and global utility) is then
ui(k) =W (k) = Nρ(k)
(
1− k
N
− c
)
,0
where ρ(k) = k/(k+1). If we view k as a continuous variable, we can obtain a maxi-
mizer, k∗ = O(
√
N(1− c)). In contrast, if we consider the case with each player occu-
pying a single grid cell (i.e., m = N), kE = O(N(1− c)). While the density of planting
approaches 1 in both the optimal and equilibrium configurations as N increases (as
long as N(1−c) 1), it turns out that the equilibrium density is generally higher than
optimal (all the results discussed here are derived in supporting online material). This
agrees with our intuition on the consequence of negative externalities of decentralized
planting decisions: when a player decides whether to plant a tree, he takes into account
only the concomitant chance of his own tree burning down, and not the global impact
the decision has on the sizes of cascades.
Armed with some intuition based on the one-dimensional model, we now turn to
our main subject, the two-dimensional forest fire model—varying systematically the
number of players, planting cost, and lightning distribution as described above. A
full analysis of the two-dimensional model in all the relevant parameters is beyond
mathematical tractability. Furthermore, the problem of computing exact equilibria, or
even exact optima for any player, is intractable, as the size of the space of joint player
strategies in our setting is 216384 (for example, at one extreme, we need to compute or
approximate an equilibrium in a game with 16384 players, each having binary strate-
gies).
Despite the daunting size of the problem, it turns out that simple iterative algorithms
for approximating equilibria as well as optimal decisions by individual players are
extremely effective. Specifically, we use the following procedure for approximating
Nash equilibria, building on previous methodological work in simulation-based game
theoretic analysis [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]:
1. Start with no trees planted as the initial joint strategy profile s
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2. For a fixed number of iterations:
(a) For each player i:
i. Fix the decisions of other players s−i
ii. With probability p, compute sˆi ← OPT(s−i), the optimal decision of
player i given s−i; with probability 1− p, let sˆi← si
iii. Set si← sˆi
This procedure is a variant of best response dynamics, which is a well-known simple
heuristic for learning in games [19]. While convergence properties of this heuristic are
somewhat weak [19, 16], it has proved to be quite effective at approximating equilibria
computationally [13, 16], and has the additional feature of being a principled model for
adaptive behavior of goal-driven agents in a strategic setting [19].
The inner loop of the algorithm involves computing an optimal (best) response of
a player i, which we already noted is in general intractable. Carlson and Doyle [5]
used a deterministic greedy heuristic to compute an optimum over an entire grid of
size 64× 64, starting with a grid devoid of trees and iteratively choosing a grid cell
that maximizes global utility given the planting choices from the previous iterations.
However, we use a larger (128×128) grid, and additionally must run the optimization
heuristic multiple times as an inner loop of equilibrium approximation, so their ap-
proach is too computationally intensive to be practical in our setting. Instead, we utilize
the somewhat lighter-weight method of sampled fictitious play [20, 21], which allows
us to more finely control the tradeoff between the amount of optimization search and
the incremental impact of additional search on solution quality. In sampled fictitious
play, each grid cell controlled by player i becomes a “player” in a cooperative subgame
(where each cell has i’s utility as its goal), and random subsets of cells are iteratively
chosen to make simultaneous optimizing decisions given a uniform random sample of
choices by the rest of the grid from a fixed window of previous iterations. Random ex-
ploration is introduced by occasionally replacing historical actions of “players” (cells
controlled by i) with randomly chosen actions. In our implementation, it turned out to
be most effective to let the history window size be 1, which makes sampled fictitious
play resemble myopic best response dynamics. Since each grid cell has only two ac-
tions, we choose the myopically best action, determined by the size of the connected
component of trees to which the cell belongs.
Insofar as the results below are the outcomes of the above algorithm, they represent,
approximately, principled predictions of coevolution of goal-directed players whose
incentives may not align with the global objective. As such, our simulation results
have an additional advantage over the 1-D mathematical characterization, which does
not allow direct insight into which of the many possible equilibrium configurations is
likely to be reached by adaptive players.
3.1 Global Utility
Our first question concerns the variation of global utility W (s∗) with the number of
players m, the cost c, and the parameter v governing variance of the Gaussian lightning
distribution. First, note that W (s∗) will be no better than optimal for m > 1, and it
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seems intuitive that it is a non-increasing function of m. Additionally, when c = 0 and
m = N, we anticipate a global utility of 0, since the only equilibria involve either all
players or all but one planting trees (we argue this formally in the online supplement).
The questions we address next are: what happens when 1 < m < N and when c > 0?
Figure 1 provides some answers. First, when c = 0, we notice that the initial drop in
global utility is quite shallow for m < 256, particularly when the lightning distribution
is relatively diffuse (v < 100). However, once the number of players is relatively large,
global utility drops dramatically, and nearly reaches 0 already when m = 4096, even
though this does not directly follow from an argument above. For c > 0, the dropoff in
global utility with the number of players becomes less dramatic.
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Figure 1: Global utility W (s∗) as a function of m for c ∈ {0,0.25,0.5,0.75,0.9}. Left:
v= 0.1 (nearly uniform distribution). Right: v= 100 (highly concentrated distribution).
3.2 Density and Fire Break Distribution
Our next task is to consider how the density changes with our parameters of interest.
Based on the observation above, we expect the density to be 1, or nearly so, when c= 0
and m = N. The density should be appreciably below 1 when m = 1. Furthermore, the
density should decrease with increasing cost c. In general, our intuition, based on
all previous analysis, would suggest that density should increase with the number of
players: after all, each player’s decision to plant a tree does not account for the negative
impact it has on other players.
Working from this intuition, the results in Figure 2 are highly counterintuitive: the
overall density falls with increasing number of players until m reaches 1024, and only
when the number of players is very high (4096 and N) is it generally higher than the
optimal density. This dip is especially apparent for a highly concentrated lightning
distribution (v = 100). To understand this phenomenon we must refer to Figure 3,
showing actual (approximate) equilibrium grid configurations for varying numbers of
players when c= 0 and v= 100. We can observe that each player’s myopic self-interest
induces him to construct fire breaks in his territory where none exist in a globally
superior single-player configuration. Thus, for example, contrast Figure 3 (a) and (b).
In the former, most of the grid is filled with trees, and much of the action happens in
the upper left corner (the epicenter of the lightning distribution), which is filled with
fire breaks that confine fires to relatively small fractions of the grid. In the latter, the
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upper left corner is now under the control of a single player, and other players find it
beneficial to plant fire breaks of their own, since the “wasted” land amounts to only a
small fraction of their landmass, and offers some protection against fire spread to the
protected areas from “poorly” protected neighboring territories. With more players, we
see coordination between neighbors emerge, as they jointly build mutually beneficial
fire breaks, but such cooperation is not global, and becomes increasingly diffuse with
greater number of players. Nevertheless, increasing the number of players results in a
greater amount of total territory devoted to fire breaks by individual players or small
local neighborhoods, and, as a result, an overall loss in planting density, which have
observed in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Density ρ as a function of m for c ∈ {0,0.25,0.5,0.75,0.9}. Left: v = 0.1
(nearly uniform distribution). Right: v = 100 (highly concentrated distribution).
Since the density is decreasing for intermediate numbers of players, a natural hy-
pothesis is that the fire breaks are distributed suboptimally. We can observe this visually
in Figure 3. Specifically, the equilibrium grid configurations suggest that the location
of fire breaks becomes less related to the lightning distribution as the number of players
grows. To measure this formally, we compute
C =
∑g∈G pg(1− sg)
1−ρ .
The numerator is the probability that lightning strikes an empty (no tree) cell, where
pg is the probability of lightning hitting cell g, and sg is the indicator that is 1 when g
has a tree and 0 otherwise. The denominator is the fraction of the grid that is empty.
The intuition behind this measure is that when fire breaks (i.e., empty cells) lie largely
in regions with a high probability of lightning, C will be much larger than 1, whereas
if empty cells are distributed uniformly on the grid, E[C] = 1.3 Figure 4 (left) confirms
our hypothesis: initially, C is quite high, but as the number of players increases, C
approaches 1. Interestingly, when the number of players is very large (m = 4096) this
result reverses, with C jumping abruptly. To understand this phenomenon, note that
when m = 4096, each player controls only a 2× 2 subgrid, which is simply too small
for a local fire break to be worthwhile unless the fire risk is very high. Thus, the
3These are both formally shown in the supporting online material.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 3: Sample equilibrium grid configurations with c = 0, v = 100, and the number
of players varied between 1 and N = 16384. Blank cells are planted and marked cells
are unplanted. Player domains of influence are shaded in a checkerboard pattern. (a) 1
player, equivalent to HOT; (b) 4 players; (c) 16 players; (d) 64 players; (e) 256 players;
(f) 1024 players; (g) 4096 players; (h) 16384 players. To avoid clutter, we omit the
checkerboard pattern with N players. Here, the grid is blank, which indicates that
every grid cell contains a tree.
only players with any incentive to build fire breaks are those close to the epicenter of
lightning.
Considering the spatial distribution of empty grid cells apart from lightning strikes,
we see in Figure 4 (right) that the centroid of the empty cells begins near the (0,0)
point, but approaches the center of the grid with increasing number of players.4 In-
terestingly, even for a moderate number of players (m = 16), the distribution of fire
breaks is nearly homogeneous and almost unrelated to the lightning distribution. This
suggests that global utility would remain relatively robust to changes in the lightning
distribution compared to the HOT model. To verify this, we show in Figure 5 average
global utility of equilibrium configuration after the lightning distribution is randomly
changed. Whether the cost of planting trees is high or low, the figure shows signifi-
cantly reduced fragility for an intermediate number of players (between 16 and 1024).
Indeed, when cost is high, the system remains less fragile than HOT even in the lim-
iting case of m = N. If we now recall that global utility remains relatively close to
optimal across a wide range of settings when m is below 256, our results suggest that
the regime of intermediate numbers of players retains the robustness of HOT, while de-
veloping some features of SOC that make it less fragile to changes in the environment.
4Here again we see that the center shifts back to near the (0,0) point when m=N/4, for the same reasons
we just outlined.
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Figure 4: Left: a measure of correlation (C, defined in the text) between the lightning
distribution and the fire breaks (empty cells) across subgrids for c = 0 and c = 0.9.
As C approaches 1, the locations of empty cells become essentially unrelated to the
distribution of lightning strikes. Right: centroid coordinates of the empty grid cells
when c = 0 (the results are similar when c = 0.9).
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Figure 5: Fragility of NOT configurations. Given the (approximate) equilibrium con-
figurations generated for a lightning distribution centered at the upper left corner of the
grid, we changed the lightning distribution by generating the center of the Gaussian
uniformly randomly from all grid locations. We the evaluated expected global util-
ity given the altered lightning distribution. The graph plots averages of repeating this
process 30-80 times, as compared to global utility for the original environment. Left:
c = 0. Right: c = 0.9.
3.3 Distribution of Burnout Cascades
One of the central results of both SOC and HOT models is a power-law distribution
of burnout cascades. Since our model generalizes HOT, we should certainly expect
to find this power-law distribution in the corresponding special case of m = 1, at least
approximately (since the power-law result in HOT is asymptotic and presumes exact,
10
not approximate, optimization). We therefore study in some detail how the burnout
distribution behaves with respect to the parameters of interest.
Figure 6 shows fire cascade distributions on the usual log-log plot for v= 10. First,
when m = 1 (red points), the results align with the expectation of a near straight line
(near power-law distribution) across a range of scales. Additionally, even when m is
greater than 1 but relatively small (green points), the distribution appears linear across
a range of scales, suggesting that the power law is likely not unique to the HOT setting.
Once the number of players is large, however, the distribution of cascades less resem-
bles a power law, and begins to feature considerable curvature even in the intermediate
scales. In that sense, the NOT setting with many players is unlike both HOT and SOC.
The most important aspect of the cascade distributions is that the tails are system-
atically increasing with the number of players in all observed settings (this remains the
case for Gaussians with greater and smaller variance, not shown here). We study this
in detail in Figure 7, which shows the 90th percentile of the burnout distribution as
a function of the number of players m for varying cost and variance of the lightning
distribution. The 90th percentile consistently increases with the number of players,
confirming the phenomenon of heavier tails with more players that we already ob-
served. As is intuitive, increasing either the cost of planting trees or the variance of the
lightning distribution has a dampening effect on burnout tails: in both cases, more fire
breaks are constructed, making very large cascades less likely.
Figure 6: Distribution of tree burnout cascades, shown on a log-log plot with Pr{X ≥ x}
on the vertical axis and x on the horizontal axis, where X is the random variable rep-
resenting cascade size. The plots feature (bottom to top) m = 1 (red), m = 16 (green),
m = 256 (blue), and m = 4096 (purple), with the left plot corresponding to c = 0 and
the right plot corresponding to c = 0.9. Both plots correspond to v = 10.
4 Discussion
The results described in the previous section show features of both HOT and SOC.
When the number of players is small, the NOT setting closely resembles HOT, and,
indeed, HOT is a special case when there is a single player. Perhaps surprisingly, fea-
tures of HOT persist even when the number of players becomes larger, but as the num-
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Figure 7: Left: 90th percentile as a function of m (plotted on a log scale) for varying
values of cost c, with v = 1. Right: 90th percentile for c = 0.75 with v = 10 (top, red)
and v = 1 (bottom, blue).
ber of players increases, we also begin to observe many features identified with SOC.
The system retains its robustness to the lightning strikes—a key feature of HOT—even
when the number of players is relatively large. It achieves this robustness in part due
to the emergence of cooperation between neighboring players, who jointly build fire
breaks spanning several players’ territories. The cooperation required to retain near-
optimal performance becomes increasingly difficult, however, as the system becomes
highly fractured among small domains of influence.
As cooperation becomes less effective, players fall back on protecting their own
domain of influence by surrounding it (or parts of it) with deforested land, so long as
the fraction of land covered by trees is large enough to make this endeavor worthwhile.
This gives rise to the counterintuitive result that the density of trees initially falls as the
number of players increases.
Since even a moderately fractured landscape requires each player to focus on pro-
tecting his or her own domain, we observe decreasing correlation between locations of
frequent lightning strikes and locations of fire breaks. With increasing number of play-
ers, this correlation systematically decreases, and the spatial distribution of empty cells
becomes increasingly homogeneous—striking features of SOC that emerge even when
the number of players is not very large and the global performance is still highly robust
to lightning strikes. Thus, the intermediate range of players appears to exhibit both
the robustness of HOT and the lack of fragility to changes in the lightning distribution
associated with SOC.
Another feature of SOC in contrast to HOT is a heavier-tailed distribution of burnout
cascades. We in fact observe that the tail of the burnout distribution becomes heavier
with increasing number of players, superficially appearing to shift to an SOC regime.
However, these distributions begin to substantially deviate from a power law even vi-
sually, and the setting is therefore in that respect entirely unlike the criticality observed
in SOC.
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A Supporting Online Material
A.1 Characterization of 1- and N-player Settings in the 1-D Case
We begin the analysis by considering the two extremes, m = 1 and m = N, in a simpler
model where the forest fire grid is one-dimensional (i.e., a line) and the lightning dis-
tribution is uniform. This analysis will provide some initial findings and intuition that
we then carry over into the more complex two-dimensional case.
Without loss of generality, let k be the length of a sequence of planted cells (1’s)
followed by l unplanted cells (0’s) and suppose that 1 k N.
First, consider the case with m = 1 and assume that c < 1−1/N. Assume that k is
identical for all sequences of 1’s (when kN, this is almost with no loss of generality,
since 1’s can be swapped, keeping the density constant, without changing the utility)
and note that in an optimal solution l = 1. The utility of the player (and global utility)
is then
ui(k) =W (k) = ∑
g∈G
(Pr
f
{g = 1 | s}− c)sg = Nρ(k)
(
1− k
N
− c
)
,
where ρ(k) = k/(k+1). This function is concave in k. To see this rewrite ui as
ui(k) =
Nk(1− c)− k2
k+1
.
Taking the first derivative, we get
u′i =
N(1− c)− k2−2k
(k+1)2
.
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Differentiating again we get
u′′i =−
2(1+N(1− c))
(k+1)3
< 0,
and, hence, ui is concave in k.
Thus, treating k as a continuous variable, which is approximately correct when
k 1, the first-order condition gives us the necessary and sufficient condition for the
optimal k∗. This condition is equivalent to
k2+2k−N(1− c) = 0.
The solutions to this quadratic equation are
k =
−2±√4+4N(1− c)
2
.
Since k must be positive, we can discard one of the solutions, leaving us with
k∗ =
√
N(1− c)+1−1.
Evaluating ρ and W at k∗, we get
ρ(k∗) =
√
N(1− c)+1−1√
N(1− c)+1
and
ui(k∗) =W (k∗) = ρ(k∗)(N(1− c)−
√
N(1− c)+1−1).
We can observe that ρ(k∗) tends to 1 as N grows, while W (k∗) tends to N(1− c) (all
derivations are shown in the supporting online material).
Consider next the case with m = N. While there are many equilibria, we can pre-
cisely characterize upper and lower bounds on k and l, and, consequently, the set of
equilibria. First, we note that l must be either 1 or 2; otherwise, by the assumption that
c < 1− 1/N, the player governing any grid cell that is not adjacent to a sequence of
1’s will prefer to plant a tree. Formally, we first note that by definition, l > 0. Suppose
l > 2 and, thus, there is a player not planting a tree who is not adjacent to another with
sg = 1. Then his utility from planting is 1− 1/N− c, and he (weakly) prefers not to
plant as long as 1−1/N− c≤ 0 or c≥ 1−1/N, which is ruled out by our assumption
that c < 1−1/N.
Second, we can get an upper bound on k by considering the incentive of a player
that is part of the sequence of 1’s. This player will prefer to plant as long as 1− k/N−
c ≥ 0, giving us kE ≤ N(1− c). A well-known measure of the impact of equilibrium
behavior on global utility is the “price of anarchy”, the ratio of optimal global utility,
here W (k∗), to global utility at the worst-case equilibrium [22, 23, 24]. The upper
bound on kE gives us the worst-case equilibrium from the perspective of global utility,
with W (kE) = 0 resulting in an infinite price of anarchy (that is, global utility in the
worst-case equilibrium is arbitrarily worse than optimal for a large enough number of
players and grid cells N).
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Looking now at the lower bound on kE , we can distinguish two cases, l = 1 and
l = 2. When l = 2, either player not planting a tree prefers not to plant as long as
1− (k+ 1)/N− c ≤ 0, and, therefore, kE ≥ N(1− c)− 1. For l = 1, suppose that the
two sequences of 1’s on either side of the non-planting player have lengths k and k′.
The player will prefer not to plant as long as 1− (k+ k′+ 1)/N − c ≤ 0, where we
are adding k and k′ since he will be joining the two sequences together if he plants.
This gives us k+k′ ≥ N(1−c)−1. Since we are after a lower bound, suppose without
loss of generality that k ≤ k′. We then get kE ≥ [N(1− c)− 1]/2. It is instructive
to apply now another measure of the impact of equilibrium behavior, the “price of
stability”, defined as the ratio of optimal global utility to global utility at the best-
case equilibrium [24, 25]. The best-case equilibrium in our case has l = 1 and kE =
[N(1− c)−1]/2, and the asymptotic price of stability is 2.
Now we compare the density at equilibrium and at the optimal configuration. We
are looking for the conditions under which the equilibrium density is strictly higher.
Notice that it certainly isn’t always the case. For example, if c > 1− 1/N, no trees
will be planted at all in equilibrium or in an optimal configuration. Consequently, the
density will be 0 in both cases. When N(1− c) 1 and N is large, the density in the
best-case equilibrium is
ρ(kE) =
N(1− c)−1
N(1− c)+1 .
Thus, ρ(kE)> ρ(k∗) iff
N(1− c)−1
N(1− c)+1 >
√
N(1− c)+1−1√
N(1− c)+1
⇔ (N(1− c)−1)
√
N(1− c)+1 > (N(1− c)+1)(
√
N(1− c)+1−1)
⇔ 2
√
N(1− c)+1 < N(1− c)+1
⇔ 4(N(1− c)+1) < (N(1− c))2+2N(1− c)+1
⇔ 2N(1− c)+3 < (N(1− c))2.
Solving the corresponding quadratic inequality gives us the condition that
N(1− c)> 3.
Since we assume N(1− c) 1 throughout, we effectively have that ρ(kE) > ρ(k∗)
under the assumptions operational here.
A.2 Equilibria When c = 0 and m = N
Suppose that each player controls a single grid cell, i.e., m = N. When cost of planting
trees is 0, there are only two Nash equilibria: one with every player planting a tree,
and another with a single player not planting. Indeed, planting is a weakly dominant
strategy for every player. To see this, suppose that the number of players planting is
z < N−1, and consider a player who is not planting a tree. If he decides to plant, the
probability of his tree burning down is at most (N−1)/N < 1, and so the player has a
strict incentive to plant. Furthermore, since there is no cost of planting, any player who
16
is planting a tree does not lose anything by doing so. Thus, every player strictly prefers
to plant as long as z < N− 1, and weakly prefers to plant when z = N− 1 (in which
case expected utility is zero whether he plants or not). Finally, every player planting
is clearly an equilibrium, and the only other equilibrium has a single player who does
not plant (since he is indifferent, and every other player strictly prefers to plant if that
player does not).
A.3 Details of Equilibrium Approximation
We now present the details of the algorithms we used to approximate equilibria. First,
we show the “outer loop” algorithm for best response dynamics as Algorithm 1. The
Algorithm 1 BestResponseDynamics(Tbr, pplayer)
sg← 0 ∀g ∈ G
for n = 1 to Tbr do
for i = 1 to m do
Fix s−i
if RAND ≤ pplayer then
sˆi← OPT(s−i)
else
sˆi← si
end if
si← sˆi
end for
end for
parameter Tbr varies depending on the number of players. For example, if there is just
one player, Tbr = 1, whereas Tbr = 50 when m = N. The variation is a consequence of
extensive experimentation looking at sensitivity of results to increasing the number of
iterations. Our values are high enough that results do not change appreciably when the
number of iterations increases. We set pplayer = 0.9.
For each player selected by the random biased coin flip (“RAND” is a uniform
random number on the unit interval), the algorithm calls OPT() to approximate the best
response of the player to a fixed grid configuration chosen by the others. Our choice for
this procedure is sampled fictitious play, which is shown in pseudocode as Algorithm 2.
Here, RAND() when called with a list argument picks a uniformly random element of
the list. ui() is a call to an oracle (a simulator) to determine i’s utility in a particular
grid configuration. ui(sg = a,s′i,s−i) denotes utility when i plays according to s′i, except
he sets sg = a. We set history size h = 1 and exploration parameter α = 0. Thus, each
grid cell at iteration t is always best-responding to the grid configuration from iteration
t−1. We set pcell = max{0.05,1/Ni}. Thus, on average, one player best-responds in
each iteration. Our parameters for both the optimization routine and the best response
routine were chosen based on extensive experimentation.
Algorithm 2 uses the subroutine ChooseActions(), which is specified as Algo-
rithm 3.
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Algorithm 2 OPT(s−i,Topt , pcell ,α,h)
sg← 0 ∀g ∈ Gi
H← () // Initialize history of past choices H to an empty list
for n = 1 to Topt do
s′i← ChooseActions(i,α,H)
sˆi← si
for g ∈ Gi do
if RAND ≤ pcell OR |Gi|= 1 then
if ui(sg = 1,s′i,s−i)> ui(sg = 0,s′i,s−i) then
sˆg← 1
else
sˆg← 0
end if
end if
end for
append back(H, sˆi) // Add sˆi at the end of list H
if |H|> h then
remove front(H) // Remove the first element
end if
if ui(sˆi,s−i)> ui(si,s−i) then
si← sˆi
end if
end for
return si
Algorithm 3 ChooseActions(i,α,H)
for g ∈ Gi do
if RAND ≤ α OR H = () then
sg← RAND((0,1))
else
sg← RAND(H)g
end if
end for
return si
18
# players Tbr Topt
1 1 200
4 5 120
16 20 80
64 20 80
256 20 80
1024 40 80
4096 20 35
16384 50 1
Table 1: Numbers of iterations of best response dynamics and sampled fictitious play
in the 2nd and 3rd column respectively.
In Table 1 we specify the number of iterations used for the outer loop (best response
dynamics) and inner loop (approximate optimization).
A.4 Relationship Between Lightning Distribution and Empty Cells
Recall our measure that captures the relationship between the distribution of empty
cells (fire breaks) on the grid and the lightning distribution:
C =
∑g∈G pg(1− sg)
1−ρ .
We now formally demonstrate that (a) C > 1 when empty cells have the largest prob-
ability of lightning and (b) E[∑g∈G pg(1− sg)] = 1−ρ when empty cells are chosen
uniformly randomly on the grid. First, suppose that the cells that have the L high-
est lightning probabilities on the grid are empty, and let probabilities be ranked from
highest to lowest such that pl indicates lth highest probability of lightning on the cor-
responding grid cell gl . Further, suppose that no two pl are the same. Then
∑
g∈G
pg(1− sg) =
N
∑
l=1
pl(1− sgl ) =
L
∑
l=1
pl >
L
N
,
where the last inequality follows since there are no ties between pl . Since LN = 1−ρ ,
the result follows.
Next we show that if empty cells are uniformly distributed, E[∑g∈G pg(1− sg)] =
1−ρ . First, note that 1−ρ = L/N if L cells are empty and the rest have a tree. Now,
suppose that each cell is empty with probability q = L/N. Then
E[∑
g∈G
pg(1− sg)] = ∑
g∈G
pgE[1− sg] = q∑
g∈G
pg = q.
Since q = L/N = 1−ρ , the result follows.
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A.5 Tree Fines
Another interesting inquiry concerns the question of policy: can imposing a fine on
planting trees alleviate the impact of negative externalities when the number of players
is large? To this end, suppose that p is a penalty for planting a tree. Global utility is
then redefined as
W (p) = Y (p)− cNρ(p),
where Y (p) and ρ(p) are the equilibrium global yield and density respectively when
the true cost of planting a tree is c but each player perceives it to be c+ p. As Figure 8
suggests, the results are somewhat mixed. First, considering just the plot on the right,
we note that a small penalty can have a large impact when m = N. Increasing the
penalty further, however, seems to improve global utility only slightly when the number
of players is large. On the other hand, the plot on the left suggests that when the number
of players is small, increasing player costs is at best ineffective, and at worst may
actually lower global utility. In either case, outcomes never quite reach the optimum,
although they come quite close when the number of players is small. The simple policy
of raising costs of players via fines is therefore a relatively ineffective instrument here,
and can at times be counterproductive.
!"#$
!"#%$
!"&$
!"&%$
'$
!$ !"(%$ !"%$ !")%$ '$
*+
,-
.+
$/
0+
123
$4
$5
60
7
.+
$/
0+
123
$
89:.+23$
;$6+.39<=$ '>$6+.39<=$ >;$6+.39<=$
!"
!#$"
!#%"
!#&"
!#'"
!#("
!#)"
!#*"
!#+"
!#,"
$"
!" !#%(" !#(" !#*(" $"
-.
/0
1.
"2
3.
456
"7
"8
93
:
1.
"2
3.
456
"
;<=1.56"
>"7")'"9.16<?@" >"7"$)"9.16<?@" >"9.16<?@"
Figure 8: Variation of global utility W (p) relative to its optimal value, as a function of
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